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ABSTRACT 
A widely accepted claim about counterfactuals is that they differ from 
strict conditionals, that is, there is no adequate representation of them 
as sentences of the form   . To justify this claim, Stalnaker and 
Lewis have argued that some fallacious inferences would turn out valid if 
counterfactuals were so represented. However, their argument has a 
flaw, as it rests on a questionable assumption about the relation between 
surface grammar and logical form. Without that assumption, no 
consequence of the alleged kind is obtained, hence the claim may be 
rejected. 
1.  
A counterfactual is a conditional ‗If it were the case that p, then it would be the 
case that q‘, where ‗p‘ is the antecedent and ‗q‘ is the consequent. For example, 
the following sentence is a counterfactual: 
 
(1) If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over 
 
The obvious paraphrase of (1) is ‗If it were the case that kangaroos have no 
tails, then it would be the case that they topple over‘. A strict conditional is a 
sentence of the form   . In the familiar semantics of modal logic,    
is true in a world w if and only if    is true in every world accessible from w. 
If we call -world a world in which   is true, this means that    is true in 
w if and only if   is true in every accessible -world. So it is tempting to say 
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that a counterfactual that has ‗p‘ as antecedent and ‗q‘ as consequent — a p/q 
counterfactual from now on  —  is a strict conditional that is true if and only if 
‗q‘ is true in every world of some suitably restricted set in which ‗p‘ is true.1  
However, Stalnaker and Lewis have argued that this temptation must be 
resisted. A strict conditional analysis of counterfactuals may appear tenable 
when one looks at this or that counterfactual, but it proves inadequate if one 
reflects on sets of counterfactuals and the logical relations they involve. At least 
three basic inference rules that hold for strict conditionals do not hold for 
counterfactuals, that is, there are at least three distinctive ―counterfactual 
fallacies‖. The first is the fallacy of strengthening the antecedent. Consider the 
argument A1: 
 
(2) If Otto had come, it would have been a lively party 
 
(3) If Otto and Anna had come, it would have been a lively party 
 
Imagine that Otto is a cheerful person, but that he just broke up with Anna 
after six months of endless rows. In such a situation (2) may be true even 
though (3) is false. In other words, (2) is consistent with 
 
(4) If Otto and Anna had come, it would have been a dreary party 
 
Therefore, A1 is invalid. But the following schema, S1, is valid: 
 
   
 
 (  )   
 
For if  is true in all accessible -worlds, a fortiori it will be true in all 
accessible -worlds in which  is true. This means that A1 cannot be 
represented as an instance of S1.2 
The second is the fallacy of transitivity. Consider the argument A2: 
 
1 Mayo (1957) is among the early works in which it is suggested that counterfactuals amount to 
strict conditionals.  
2 Stalnaker (1991, p. 38); Lewis (1973, pp. 10–13 and 31). The sequence formed by (2) and (4) is 
called a Sobel sequence, from Lewis(1973, p. 10, fn). 
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(5) If Anna had gone to the party, Waldo would have gone 
(6) If Otto had gone to the party, Anna would have gone 
 
(7) If Otto had gone to the party, Waldo would have gone 
 
Imagine that Waldo fancies Anna, although he never runs the risk of meeting 
his successful rival Otto. Imagine also that Otto was locked up at the time of the 
party, so that his going to the party is a remote possibility, but that Anna almost 
did go, as she hoped to meet him. In such a situation (5) and (6) may be true 
even though (7) is false. Therefore, A2 is invalid. However, the following 
schema, S2, is valid: 
 
   
   
 
    
 
For if all accessible -worlds are -worlds and all accessible -worlds are -
worlds, then all accessible -worlds are -worlds. So A2 cannot be represented 
as an instance of S2.3 
The third is the fallacy of contraposition. Consider the argument A3: 
 
(8) If Otto had gone to the party, Anna would have gone 
 
(9) If Anna had not gone, Otto would not have gone 
 
Imagine that Otto wanted to go to the party but stayed away just to avoid Anna, 
while Anna would definitely have gone if Otto had been around. In such a 
situation (8) may be true even though (9) is false. Therefore, A3 is invalid. 
However, the following schema, S3, is valid: 
 
 
3 (Stalnaker,  1991, p. 38; Lewis, 1973, pp. 32–33). Note that S2 entails S1, as it is easily seen if   
is replaced with   . So the failure of S1 alone suffices to discard S2. 
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   
 
   
 
For    and    have the same truth-value in every world. This means 
that A3 cannot be represented as an instance of S3 (Lewis, 1973, p. 35; 
Stalnaker, 1991,  p. 39).  
The Stalnaker-Lewis argument may be summarized as follows. If 
counterfactuals are strict conditionals, then A1–A3 instantiate S1–S3. But that 
is absurd. A1–A3 are invalid arguments, while S1–S3 are valid schemas. So 
counterfactuals are not strict conditionals. This paper is intended to provide a 
reason to doubt the Stalnaker-Lewis argument. 
2.  
The line of resistance that will be suggested differs from at least three 
objections that may be prompted by some contextualist accounts of 
counterfactuals as strict conditionals that have emerged recently. The 
assumption that the three objections share is that counterfactuals are highly 
context-sensitive strict conditionals, in that the accessibility relation associated 
with them varies as a function of their antecedent. On this assumption, 
counterfactuals with different antecedents are intuitively assessed relative to 
different contexts, because their antecedents select different sets of relevantly 
similar worlds.4 
The first objection goes as follows. It is wrong to assume that A1–A3 are 
invalid arguments. In order to evaluate A1–A3, just as any other argument 
affected by context-sensitivity, the context must be held fixed. An argument is 
valid if and only if, for every context, if the premises are true relative to that 
context then the conclusion is true relative to that context. But A1–A3 are such 
that there is no context relative to which the premises are true and the 
 
4 The supposition that the counterfactuals in a Sobel sequence — hence in A1  — are strict conditionals 
that involve different contexts, initially dismissed in (Lewis, 1973, p. 13), is developed in (von Fintel, 
2001)  and in (Gillies, 2007). (Lowe, 1995, pp. 56–57), suggests that arguments such as A2 can be 
treated as cases of equivocation due to context-sensitivity. 
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conclusion false, hence they are valid. The invalidity of A1–A3 is only 
apparent, due to the context-shifts in their intended reading.5  
This objection is not entirely convincing. Even if one grants that the 
counterfactuals in A1–A3 involve different contexts, and that no context makes 
the premises true and the conclusion false, one is not compelled to conclude 
that A1–A3 are valid. Certainly, the definition of validity as truth-preservation 
in any context entails that conclusion, so it clashes with our inclination to 
regard A1–A3 as invalid. But this clash does not show that our inclination is 
misplaced more than it shows that the definition is unable to handle such cases. 
In what follows it will be taken for granted that A1–A3 are invalid, just as they 
appear.  
The second objection is opposite to the first, as it attacks the assumption 
that S1–S3 are valid schemas. A proponent of the view that counterfactuals are 
highly context-sensitive strict conditionals may grant that A1–A3 are invalid 
arguments and that A1–A3 instantiate S1–S3, but claim that S1–S3 are invalid 
precisely in virtue of that fact. For a schema is valid just in case all its instances 
are valid arguments. 
This objection throws the baby out with the bathwater. To deny that S1–S3 
are valid schemas is to deny the basic principles of modal logic. For the validity 
of S1–S3 follows from those principles. If S1–S3 are invalid, then the 
semantics of the language in which they are expressed is not the familiar 
semantics of modal logic, and  does not have its familiar meaning. Even if one 
is willing to accept this consequence, which is not easy to swallow, the question 
remains of how one can maintain the claim that counterfactuals are strict 
conditionals in some sense that is relevant to the Stalnaker-Lewis argument. 
For that argument is intended to dismiss the claim that counterfactuals are 
strict conditionals in the familiar sense.  
The third objection goes as follows. A1–A3 are invalid arguments, S1–S3 
are valid schemas, but there is nothing absurd in the supposition that A1–A3 
instantiate S1–S3. When  occurs more than once in an argument and it is 
associated with different accessibility relations, the possibility that the 
premises of the argument are true and the conclusion false is not detectable 
 
5 A reasoning along these lines is offered in Brogaard & Salerno (2008), although it is not 
accompanied by a strict conditional analysis of counterfactuals. Cross (2011) questions the 
contextualist assumptions that underlie that reasoning. 
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from its logical form. In other words, the invalidity of A1–A3 is not amenable 
to formal explanation. 
This objection is defeatist in at least one important respect. As long as 
formalization is understood in the usual way as a representation of logical form 
that displays fundamental logical properties such as validity, it is hard to make 
sense of the claim that A1–A3 are invalid arguments that instantiate S1–S3. To 
say so is to say something odd, namely, that although it is correct to represent 
the counterfactuals in A1–A3 as strict conditionals, such representation plays 
no role in a formal explanation of the logical properties of A1–A3. Nothing like 
this will be suggested here. Logical form does play a role in formal explanation, 
hence the logical properties of A1–A3 must be detectable from the logical form 
of the counterfactuals in them. 
3.  
So far there is nothing to object to the Stalnaker-Lewis argument. A1–A3 are 
invalid arguments, S1–S3 are valid schemas, and the supposition that A1–A3 
instantiate S1–S3 leads to absurdity. The flaw of the argument lies elsewhere, 
namely, in the assumption that if counterfactuals are strict conditionals then 
A1–A3 instantiate S1–S3. Presumably, the rationale for this assumption is that 
the only way to represent a p/q counterfactual as a strict conditional is to 
suppose that its logical form is expressed by a formula    where  stands 
for ‗p‘ and  stands for ‗q‘. But that is not the only way, nor is the best. There is 
another way to represent a p/q counterfactual as a strict conditional, which is 
in accordance with the plausible hypothesis that the meaning of the 
counterfactual is that in any possible world in which p, and which resembles 
our world as much as the supposition that p permits it to, q. The view is that the 
logical form of a p/q counterfactual is   , where  does not stand for ‗p‘ 
but for the stronger condition that p and for the rest things are like in our world 
as much as the supposition that p permits it to. For example, in the case of (1) 
 expresses the condition that kangaroos have no tails and for the rest things 
are like in our world as much as kangaroos having no tails permits it to. That is, 
if  stands for ‗Kangaroos have no tails‘,  amounts to    , where  expresses 
the similarity constraint required. The idea that underlies this view turns out 
clear if one reflects on the contrast between a p/q counterfactual and an overt 
strict conditional ‗Necessarily, if p then q‘. Consider (1) and the following 
sentence: 
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(10) Necessarily, if kangaroos have no tails, then they topple over 
 
While the truth condition of (10) is that kangaroos topple over in any possible 
world in which they have no tails, the truth-condition of (1) is that kangaroos 
topple over in any possible world such that kangaroos have no tails and things 
are like our world as much as the supposition that kangaroos have no tails 
permits it to. Now consider a formal representation of (1) as   . If the 
same formula were assigned to (10), as required by the supposition that  
stands for ‗Kangaroos have no tails‘, there would be no way to distinguish (1) 
from (10) by looking at its formal representation. But this would go against 
something that is usually taken for granted about formalization, namely, that 
sentences with different truth-conditions are to be represented by means of 
distinct formulas, that is, formulas that can have different truth-values in the 
same interpretation. It is natural to expect that the difference in truth-
conditions between (1) and (10) is formally represented, so that the 
corresponding formulas have different truth-values in some interpretation. Or 
at least, this is what Stalnaker, Lewis and many others would say. The simplest 
way to draw the distinction is to assign a different formula    to (10), 
assuming that  stands for ‗Kangaroos have no tails‘ while  amounts to a 
stronger condition   . In substance, the idea is that the logical form of 
counterfactuals systematically diverges from their surface grammar, in that the 
antecedent of the formula that expresses their truth-condition does not 
correspond to their antecedent. In that sense counterfactuals differ from overt 
strict conditionals, whose antecedent is stated explicitly.6   
On this view, A1–A3 do not instantiate S1–S3. Consider A1. If (2) is 
represented as   , then   does not stand for ‗Otto has come‘ but for 
‗Otto has come and for the rest things are like in our world as much as Otto 
coming permits it to‘. So (3) cannot be represented as  (  )  . Rather, it 
is to be represented as   , where  expresses a condition that entails ‗Otto 
and Anna has come‘ but is not reducible to a conjunction that includes . For 
one thing is to require that a world is similar to ours as much as the truth of 
‗Otto has come‘ permits it to, quite another thing is to require that a world is 
 
6 In a longer paper, Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals, I spell out the view that counterfactuals are 
strict conditionals whose antecedent is stated elliptically, and compare it with the account of 
counterfactuals suggested by Stalnaker and Lewis. 
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similar to ours as much as the truth of ‗Otto and Anna has come‘ permits it to. 
Therefore, the schema instantiated by A1 is not S1 but the following, S4: 
 
   
 
   
 
Consider A2. If (6) is represented as   , then (5) cannot be 
represented as    but rather as   , where   entails . Therefore, the 
schema instantiated by A2 is not S2 but the following, S5: 
 
   
   
 
    
 
Finally, consider A3. If (8) is represented as   , the antecedent of the 
formula that represents (9) cannot be  but a different formula  that entails 
. Similarly, its consequent cannot be  but a different formula  that 
stands for ‗Otto has not gone‘. Therefore, the schema instantiated by A3 is not 
S3 but the following, S6: 
 
   
 
   
 
Since S4–S6 are invalid schemas, the invalidity of A1–A3 is easily 
explained. A fallacy is a bad argument that may appear good at first sight, and 
counterfactual fallacies are no exception in this respect. A1–A3 may seem 
valid, in that the antecedents of the counterfactuals they contain make them 
look similar to other arguments that instantiate valid schemas. But in reality 
they are invalid, since they do not instantiate those schemas. 
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